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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
Appellant has brought this action for specific performance 
to compel Respondents to convey title to certain improved real 
estate, ostensibly under a standard form Earnest Money Receipt 
and Offer to Purchase. 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
This was a non-jury trial which commenced on August 9, 1978 
in the Third Judicial District court for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Dean E. Conder presiding. The trial court 
concluded that the Earnest Money Agreement was not capable of 
specific performance, entered judgment in favor of Respondents, 
and ordered Respondents to return to Appellant the $500.00 con-
sideration paid by him to Respondents at the time of the execution 
of the Earnest Money Agreement. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmation of the conclusions and judgment 
of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents are associated as a General Partnership doing 
business under the name of c. Howard Alvey & Sons. On or about 
April 23, 1976 Appellant entered into an Earnest Money Receipt 
and Offer to Purchase (hereinafter "Agreement") [Exhibit 1] with 
Respondents. The Agreement was negotiated for Respondents by 
Richard Lambert and was signed by Respondent Michael Alvey. 
Lambert and Appellant had had four to six discussions prior to 
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the signing of the Agreement [R. 66] . At the time of the signing 
Respondents were engaged in negotiations for the sale of four 
lots on Hillview Drive, including the corner lot. Respondents 
were subsequently able to purchase three of the four lots. The 
owner of the corner lot had decided not to sell, and Respondents 
were unable to obtain it [R. 92-93, 113-14]. 
The Agreement provided for the sale of "property situated at 
the corner of Hillview and Ninth East," for a total purchase 
price of $70,000 [Exhibit 1]. Appellant paid $500.00 in Earnest 
Money at the time of the signing [Exhibit 3]. 
At that time it had not been decided which of the three 
fourplexes owned by Respondents would be sold to Appellant [R. 
95-98]. Richard Lambert, who represented Respondents in the 
formation of the Agreement, testified that he had never indicated 
to Appellant which lot Appellant was to receive [R. 131]. The 
Agreement did not specify how the balance of the purchase price 
was to be paid. It stated only "terms to be arranged." Appellant 
testified at trial that "terms to be arranged" indicated that the 
terms of financing had not yet been negotiated at the time of the 
signing of the Agreement [R. 70] . He testified further that 
there had been no specific discussion whether the balance of the 
purchase price would be paid in lump sum, by installment payments, 
or some other way [R. 57]. Lambert's testimony was supportive of 
Appellant's on this point. He stated at trial that there had 
been no discussion with Appellant regarding how the purchase 
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would be financed [R. 131]. 
After the signing of the Agreement, Appellant made appli-
cation for a loan from Zions First National Bank, Salt Lake City, 
Utah (hereinafter "Zions Bank") in an amount of eighty percent 
(80%) of the purchase price of the property [R. 73]. He never 
received any written commitment that he would receive such a 
loan, nor had he ever received any proceeds as a result of his 
application [R. 58, 74]. Appellant applied to one or more other 
lending institutions in an attempt to raise the balance of the 
purchase price, but never received any proceeds therefrom [R. 74-
75]. There was no evidence presented at trial that Respondents 
had received a construction loan from Zions Bank based on a 
financing commitment received from Zions Bank by Appellant. The 
testimony of the Bank's loan officer, Douglas Giver, to whom 
Appellant had applied, was that he could not remember whether 
Appellant had been qualified [R. 103-04]. Appellant never has 
been in possession of the balance of the purchase price [R. 67, 
81], nor has he ever made any tender or offer of such to Respon-
dents [R. 75]. He testified that he has never had the means to 
pay that amount without liquidating other assets [R. 76]. 
On March 23, 1977 Appellant received a letter from Respon-
dents asking that Appellant deposit approximately $13,000 in an 
escrow account in Zions Bank [Exhibit 4; R. 59-60]. Appellant 
deposited a check for $13,500 in the Bank on April 8, 1977 
[Exhibit 5; R. 61], although he did not feel that he was required 
-3-
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to do so under the terms of the Agreement [R. 60-61]. Six weeks 
later on May 20, 1977 Appellant withdrew the full amount in the 
escrow account of $13,500. He did so because, as he stated at 
trial, the fourplex units had not yet been completed and because 
the escrow account was non-interest bearing [R. 62]. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS 
OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT. SUCH 
FINDINGS SHOULD BE EXAMINED, ON APPEAL, 
IN A LIGHT FAVORABLE TO RESPONDENTS. 
The trial court's Findings of Fact were as follows: 
1. On or about April 23, 1976 the plaintiff 
and defendants entered into an Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase entered into as 
evidence as plaintiff's Exhibit l herein. 
2. At the time of execution of said agreement 
no specific fourplex, of which there were three 
offered for sale by defendants, was agreed upon. 
None of the fourplexes being offered for sale by 
defendants are located at the "corner of Hillview 
and Ninth East" as provided in Exhibit l, Line 5. 
3. At the time of execution of Exhibit l, the 
plaintiff intended to consummate the purchase by 
obtaining financing of a substantial portion of 
the purchase price and, therefore, the terms 
regarding financing, to wit "terms to be arranged," 
were not discussed, negotiated or agreed to, but 
were left to future agreement. It was discussed 
and agreed, however, that the agreement was con-
tingent upon plaintiff obtaining the necessary 
financing. 
4. At no time has plaintiff ever actually obtained 
the financing necessary to consummate the purchase 
-4-
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of the property, nor has he made any offer or tender 
of the purchase price nor demonstrated his ability 
to consummate purchase. [R. 41-42] 
The Supreme Court is empowered by the Utah Constitution, 
Art. VIII, Sec. 9, to review questions of fact on appeal in 
equity cases. Such power notwithstanding, it has been the prac-
tice of this court not to disturb the findings of fact of the 
trial court unless such findings appear to be "clearly erroneous 
and against the weight of the evidence." McBride v. McBride, 
581 P.2d 996, 997 (Ut. 1978). This rule is supported by Del 
Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Ut.2d 286, 495 P.2d 811, 812 (1972); 
Nokes v. Continental Min. & Mill. Co., 6 Ut.2d 177, 308 P.2d 954, 
954-55 (1957); and Crocket v. Nish, 106 Ut. 241, 147 P.2d 852, 
854 (1944), all of which were cited by Appellant in his brief. 
InKier v. Condrack, 25 Ut.2d 139, 478 P.2d 327, 329 (1970) the 
court stated that in reviewing the facts of a case in equity the 
court should do so in the light of the evidence as believed by 
the trial court, and not necessarily as urged from the point of 
view of the Appellant. See also Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Ut.2d 
39, 465 P.2d 356, 357 (1970). It has been further held that in 
equity cases considerable difference will be allowed for the 
advantageous position of the trial court, which provides a better 
basis for insight into the truthfulness of the testimony, Nokes, 
supra. The findings and judgment of the trial court will thus be 
left undisturbed unless "the evidence clearly preponderates 
against them, or the court has mistaken or misapplied the law 
-5-
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applicable thereto." Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452, 454 (Ut. 
1975). This rule is equally applicable in cases where the relief 
sought is specific performance. Cook v. Gardner, 14 Ut.2d 193, 
381 P. 2d 78 (1963). 
Respondents maintain that there was ample evidence presented 
at trial to support the Findings of Fact of the trial court. The 
Findings are not "clearly erroneous" nor do they "preponderate 
against the evidence," as must be shown before such findings may 
be upset on appeal. Respondents urge that as this court examines 
the evidence it do so in a light favorable to the Findings of the 
trial court. 
A. Location of the Fourplex. There was sufficient evidence 
to support the trial court's Finding of Fact that no specific 
fourplex was agreed upon, and that none of the fourplexes being 
offered for sale by Respondents was located at the place desig-
nated in the Agreement [R. 41]. 
The Agreement specifies that the Earnest Money given by 
Appellant was to secure the purchase of property situated at 
"corner of Hillview and Ninth East." Respondents never at any 
time owned a lot on any corner of those two intersecting streets 
(R. 93, 113-14]. The instant action was instituted by Appellant 
to cause Respondents to sell him another lot owned by Respondents, 
which in no way can be construed as being located at the "corner 
of Hillview and Ninth East." Appellant testified at trial that 
the fourplex for which he had entered into the Agreement was not 
-6-
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located at that corner [R. 64-66]. At the time of the signing of 
the contract Respondents did not own any lot on Hillview Drive, 
but were in the process of negotiating for the purchase of four 
lots, including the corner lot. Respondents were subsequently 
able to purchase three of the lots, but the owner of the corner 
lot decided not to sell [R. 92-93, 113-14]. Appellant further 
stated that at the signing of the Agreement he did not have any 
document which gave a better description of the location of the 
fourplex he was to buy than the statement in the Agreement that 
it was on the corner of Hillview and Ninth East [R. 66]. 
Appellant cites Kier, supra, and Continental Bank & 
Trust co. v. Stewart, 4 Ut.2d 228, 291 P.2d 890, 891-92 (1957) 
for the proposition that surrounding circumstances can be ex-
amined and parol evidence admitted to aid in the determination of 
the intent of the parties at the time of the signing of a contract. 
However, these cases plainly state that the contract should first 
be examined on its face, and that extrinsic evidence will only be 
admitted to determine the intent of the parties if the written 
contract is vague and uncertain on a particular point. Continental 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 Ut.2d 98, 306 P.2d 773, 775 (1957) 
states that the intent of the parties should first be ascertained 
from "the four corners of the instrument itself" before extrinsic 
evidence will be allowed, and that if the ambiguity can be re-
conciled from a reasonable interpretation of the instrument, 
extrinsic evidence should not be allowed. In the instant case 
-7-
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there is no need to venture beyond the four corners of the Agree-
ment, which specifies that the lot to be sold was on the corner 
of Hillview and Ninth East. Respondents had been unable to 
negotiate the purchase of the corner lot. Thus, since the 
Respondents never did own the corner lot, the contract for its 
sale is plainly unenforceable. 
Appellant asserts that it was the intent of Respondents 
to sell him one of the three lots which Respondents were able to 
purchase. Assuming, arguendo, that this was true, there is no 
evidence regarding which of the three lots, none of which was 
located on the corner, was to go to Appellant. At the time of 
the execution of the Agreement, Respondents had negotiated to 
sell only one of the three lots [R. 95]. It was yet to be nego-
tiated which of the two remaining lots would be sold to Appellant 
[R. 95-98]. Richard Lambert, who represented Respondents in the 
formation of the Agreement, testified that he had never indicated 
to Appellant, either before or at the time of the signing of the 
Agreement, which lot Appellant was to receive [R. 131]. 
The fact that two of the three lots were eventually 
sold, leaving one remaining, is irrelevant. At the time of the 
signing of the Agreement it was uncertain which of the lots 
Appellant was to receive. In both Kier, supra, and Continental 
Bank & Trust v. Stewart, supra, this court held that the purpose 
of an examination of extrinsic evidence is to ascertain the 
intent of the parties at the time of the signing of the contract. 
-8-
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In the instant case the testimony demonstrates unequivocally that 
at the time of the signing of the Agreement it was not certain 
which of the three lots Appellant was to receive [R. 95-98, 131]. 
Appellant argued that parol evidence admitted at trial establishes 
the identity of the fourplex for which he is suing. This court 
has held, regarding the use of parol evidence in identifying 
property, in Davison v. Robbins, 30 Ut.2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026 
( 197 3) : 
Parol evidence is admissible to apply, not 
to supply, a description of lands in a contract. 
Parol evidence will not be admitted to complete 
a defective description or to show the intention 
with which it was made. Parol evidence may be 
used for the purpose of identifying the descrip-
tion contained in the writing with its location 
upon the ground, but not for the purpose of as-
certaining and locating the land about which the 
parties negotiated, and supplying a description 
thereof which they have omitted from the writing. 
Id. at 1029. 
B. Terms to be Arranged. There was sufficient evidence 
presented at trial to support the trial court's Finding of Fact 
that Appellant intended to obtain financing of a substantial 
portion of the purchase price, and that terms regarding financing, 
"terms to be arranged," were not discussed, negotiated or agreed 
to, but were left to future agreement [R. 42]. 
Appellant testified as follows: 
Q. And why don't you tell me what was said 
relative to that term on Line 21, Terms 
to be Arranged; what you said and what 
he said? 
A. I believe as he was reviewing the Agreement 
with me, he simply indicated that it would 
-9-
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be filled out that way since we did not know 
yet what closing date would be or the final 
details of the financing. 
Q. And did you have any further discussions 
than that? 
A. No. 
Q. Just that it would be left that way since 
you didn't know the closing date or how 
did you say it, final details of the financing? 
A. The details of the financing, the portion that 
I needed to borrow. 
[R. 70] 
Appellant also testified that he had no discussions with Respon-
dents concerning the payment of the balance of the purchase price 
[R. 57]. He stated that he did discuss with Richard Lambert 
"generally what he [Lambert] thought financing terms would be at 
Zions [Bank] if he applied with his balance sheet," but that 
there was "no specific discussion" whether the amount would be 
paid in lump sum, or by installment payments, or by any other 
manner [R. 57]. 
Richard Lambert testified that the phrase "terms to be 
arranged" referred to the fact that Appellant was to arrange for 
future financing of the balance of the purchase price of the 
fourplex [R. 121-22]. He further testified that it was not 
specifically discussed whether Appellant would pay the balance by 
cash or if he would finance it, but that he assumed it would be 
financed [R. 131]. Appellant asserts that Lambert told Responder.! 
that Appellant was going to arrange financing with Zions Bank and 
-10-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pay Respondents the full balance of the purchase price at the 
closing of title to the fourplex [Brief of Appellant, p. 10]. 
The evidence does not support this assertion. The arrangement 
was not that definite. Appellant himself testified that there 
was no specific discussion "as to whether the amount would be 
paid in lump sum, or by installment payments, or any other means" 
[R. 57]. Lambert merely testified that the Agreement "was a very 
loose arrangement" and that he had told Respondents that "what 
Alan [Appellant] will do is get his financing and probably cash 
you out at the time of the completion" [R. 123] (emphasis added). 
The evidence presented at trial lends ample support to the finding 
of the trial court that the terms of financing were yet to be 
negotiated at a future point, after the Agreement had been entered 
into. 
It was further discussed and agreed that the Agreement 
was contingent upon Appellant obtaining the necessary financing 
[R. 126]. 
c. Appellant's Financing of the Purchase. There was also 
sufficient evidence presented at the trial to support the Finding 
of Fact of the trial court that Appellant had never at any time 
obtained the financing necessary to consummate the purchase of 
the property, and that he had not made any offer or tender of the 
purchase price nor demonstrated his ability to consummate the 
purchase [R. 42]. 
Appellant testified at trial that at the time of the 
-11-
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signing of the Agreement (April 23, 1976) he did not have $70,000 
in cash, but that he would have to have it financed [R. 67). He 
stated that although he did thereafter seek financing at Zions 
Bank, he never received any written commitment that he would be 
given the loan [R. 58). He further testified that he had never 
received any proceeds from Zions Bank from his application for 
the loan [R. 74). 
Appellant had applied to one or more lending institutions, 
besides Zions Bank, according to his testimony, but had never 
received any proceeds from any such institutions [R. 75). Accord-
ing to his own testimony, Appellant never at any time had the 
means, without borrowing or liquidating some of his other assets, 
to pay the balance of the purchase price ($69,500) [R. 76, 81). 
Appellant testified that he had never made any tender or 
offer of the balance of the purchase price to Respondents [R. 75]. 
Contrary to Appellant's assertions in his brief that 
Appellant's loan would have been closed at the same time the 
construction of the fourplex was projected to be completed [Brief 
of Appellant, pp. 10-11, 14), there is no evidence that Appellant 
had any promise from any Bank that the necessary funds would be 
lent to him. The portions of the record cited by Appellant do 
not support his conclusions. 
Appellant further claims in his Brief that Appellant's 
loan application had to be approved by Zions Bank as a condition 
precedent to Zions Bank granting a construction to Respondents 
-12-
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[Brief of Appellant, pp. 3, 11]. He cites to the testimony of 
Douglas Giver, the loan officer at Zions Bank to whom Appellant 
had made application. However, Giver's testimony at the trial 
was that he could not remember whether Appellant had been quali-
fied for the loan or not. He does not state anywhere that the 
granting of Appellant's loan was a condition precedent to the 
granting of Respondents' construction loan [R. 103-10]. If such 
was the case, why did Appellant apply for a loan at one or more 
lending institutions besides Zions Bank, as he testified he did? 
[R. 75] 
Respondents maintain that the evidence presented at 
trial is supportive of the trial court's Findings of Fact and 
urge this court to consider such evidence in a light favorable to 
the findings. The Findings of Fact are solidly based on the 
evidence. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
CONCLUDING, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT 
THE AGREEMENT WAS VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS, 
UNCERTAIN, CONTINGENT AND INCOMPLETE 
ON ITS FACE AND THAT IT IS NOT CAPABLE 
OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
The trial court's Conclusions of Law are as follows: 
1. The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase, plaintiff's Exhibit 1, is vague, 
ambiguous, uncertain, contingent and incomplete 
on its face and is not capable of specific per-
formance. 
2. The plaintiff has failed to establish a 
valid, legally enforceable contract or that he 
-13-
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has complied with its terms by performing or 
offering to perform his portion of the Agreement 
by obtaining the necessary financing or tendering 
the purchase price, and, therefore, cannot main-
tain an action for specific performance. 
3. The plaintiff is entitled to refund of the 
Earnest Money deposit of $500.00. [R. 41-42] 
This court, in Pagano, supra, stated that considerable 
indulgence would be given to the findings and judgment of the 
trial court in an equity case, and that a judgment would not be 
overruled unless the trial court had mistaken or misapplied the 
law applicable to the facts. Id. at 454. The trial court in the 
present case has properly applied the law to the facts of this 
case. The judgment of the trial court should not be overruled. 
The general rule regarding specific performance was stated 
by this court in Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Ut.2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 
(1967). There the plaintiff and defendant had signed an Earnest 
Money Agreement for the sale of property. The defendant had 
agreed to sell 30 acres of the 189 acres which he owned, but the 
Earnest Money Agreement did not specify which 30 acres of the 189 
acres were to be conveyed to the plaintiff. The contract was 
additionally unclear regarding how the sale was to be financed. 
The court held the Agreement unenforceable: 
Specific performance cannot be required unless all 
terms of the agreement are clear. The court can-
not compel the performance of a contract which the 
parties did not mutually agree upon. Id. at 493. 
Quoting from 49 Am. Jur., Specific Performance, Sec. 22 at 35, the 
court held further: 
-14- J 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The contract must be free from doubt, vagueness 
and ambiguity, so as to leave nothing to conjecture 
or to be supplied by the court. It must be suffi-
ciently certain and definite in its terms to leave 
no reasonable doubt as to what the parties intended, 
and no reasonable doubt of the specific thing equity 
is called upon to have performed, and it must be 
sufficiently certain as to its terms so that the 
court may enforce it as actually made by the parties. 
A greater degree of certainty is required for 
specific performance in equity than is necessary 
to establish a contract as the basis of an action 
at law for damages. Id. at 493. 
The instant case is identical to the Pitcher case. l'lhich 
lot, of the three owned by Respondents, was to be conveyed to 
Appellant was not determined at the time of the signing of the 
Agreement. The terms of financing were equally unclear. 
Appellant cites in Kier, supra, in support of his argument 
that the judgment of the trial court was erroneous. The opinion 
in Kier was subscribed to by only one other Justice. One Justice 
concurred only in the result and two other members of the court 
dissented. All three cited Pitcher as correctly stating the law 
regarding specific performance. 
The Kier case can be easily distinguished from the case at 
hand. Most importantly, the lower court in the Kier case had 
ruled in favor of the plaintiff and had upheld the validity of 
the Earnest Money Agreement. Thus the issue on appeal was whether 
there was sufficient evidence to support such a judgment. This 
court accordingly examined the evidence in a light favorable to 
the lower court's findings and held that the evidence was suffi-
cient. In Kier the property in controversy was well-defined in 
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the agreement. In the instant case it is not. In Kier the 
plaintiff had made a tender of the entire purchase price to the 
defendant. 478 P.2d at 329. In the instant case no tender was 
ever made. The only similarity between Kier and the case at bar 
lies in the fact that in both cases the terms for financing were 
to be arranged in the future. The Kier court stated: 
Under the evidence and the particular facts of 
this case, we are not convinced that we should 
disagree with the view of this matter which it 
is apparent was taken by the trial court. 
Id. at 330 (emphasis added) 
It was further noted that: 
The reference to terms of payment could well be 
regarded in this particular situation as inci-
dental details. But neither party should be 
permitted to use the reservation of 'terms' to 
get more than they had promised, nor either to 
renege on the bargain, as it appears that the 
trial court believes was done here. 
Id. at 330 (emphasis added) 
Thus the court, in examining the evidence in a light favorable to 
the findings of the trial court, intended to limit Kier to its 
facts. 
In the instant case the conclusion of the trial court, that 
the Agreement is unenforceable, is valid because the location of 
the particular fourplex is uncertain on the face of the Agreement, 
and because the terms of financing were to be arranged. 
In Eckard v. Smith, 527 P.2d 660 (1979) this court held that 
"specific performance cannot be granted unless the terms are 
clear, and that clarity must be found from the language used in 
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the document." Id. at 662. Since the terms of the Agreement in 
the present case are not clear from the language in the document, 
specific performance cannot be granted. 
68 A.L.R.2d 1221, 1222 states: 
The terms governing the manner and time of 
payment of the price agreed upon have ordinarily 
been regarded as such an important part of the 
agreement that where the alleged contract expressly 
left these terms open for future negotiation, the 
courts have usually held that the minds of the 
parties have never in fact met upon the essentials 
and a conveyance of the property would not be 
specifically enforced. 
See Id. at 1222-28. 71 Am. Jur. 2d, Specific Performance, Sec. 41 
at 63, is in accord. 
Respondents contend that the trial court has not mistaken or 
misapplied the law applicable to the Findings of Fact. The 
conclusion that the Agreement was vague, ambiguous, uncertain, 
contingent and incomplete on its face, and that it was not capable 
of specific performance should be upheld. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING, 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT APPELLANT HAD FAILED 
TO ESTABLISH A VALID, LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE 
CONTRACT OR THAT HE HAD COMPLIED WITH ITS 
TERMS BY PERFORMING OR OFFERING TO PERFOID1 
HIS PORTION OF THE AGREEMENT BY OBTAINING THE 
NECESSARY FINANCING OR TENDERING THE PURCHASE 
PRICE, AND THAT HE THEREFORE CANNOT MAINTAIN 
AN ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
The general rule in equity regarding the tender of performance 
is that a party seeking specific performance of a contract must 
show that he has made an appropriate effort to perform his obli-
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gations under the contract. Equitable principles require that 
Appellant must of necessity have made a tender of performance 
before suing for specific performance. This court so held in 
Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45 (Ut. 1974) in which the plaintiffs 
sued for specific performance by the defendants of an Earnest 
Money Agreement for property owned by the defendants. The plain-
tiffs contended that they had sufficiently tendered performance 
by giving notice to the defendants that they were ready and 
willing to enter into and perform the purchase contract as 
planned. The court held that this tender of performance was not 
sufficient because plaintiffs had not tendered any amount of the 
purchase price, and that they had not indicated whether they had 
available the $75,000 which was to be paid upon the execution of 
the contract. The court stated: 
But it is also true that specific performance is 
a remedy of equity; and one who invokes it must 
have clean hands in having done equity himself. 
That is, he must take care to discharge his own 
duties under the contract; He must make an 
effort to perform or to tender performance, which 
manifests reasonable diligence and a bona fide 
desire to keep his own promises. Id. at 46-47. 
This court also held similarly in Lincoln Land & Development Co. 
v. Thompson, 26 Ut.2d 324, 489 P.2d 426 (1971); Nance v. Schoonover 
521 P.2d 896 (1974), both of which dealt with tender of performance 
under an option contract. See also 71 Am. Jur. 2d, Specific 
Performance, Sec. 60 at 87-88. 
The only attempt which Appellant made toward the tendering 
of performance was in depositing $13,500 in an escrow account in 
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Zions Bank, in accordance with a request made to Appellant by 
Respondents in a letter dated March 23, 1977 [Exhibit 4; R. 59-61]. 
Appellant deposited the check on April 8, 1977 [Exhibit 5; R. 61]. 
However, on Hay 20, 1977 Appellant withdrew the $13,500 from 
Zions Bank. He stated that he withdrew the money because the 
fourplex was still not completed and because the account was non-
interest bearing [R. 62]. Respondents contend that the actions 
of Appellant in depositing $13,500 in an escrow account for six 
weeks and then withdrawing it do not satisfy the legal requirement 
that he tender performance. 
The trial court has not mistaken or misapplied the law 
applicable to the Findings of Fact. The conclusion of law that 
Appellant cannot maintain an action for specific performance, 
since he failed to obtain the necessary financing or to tender 
the purchase price of the fourplex, should be affirmed by this 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented at trial strongly supports the con-
clusions of the trial court that the Earnest !'Ioney Agreement 
entered into by Appellant and Respondents is incapable of specific 
performance. There is ample evidence upon which the trial court 
could have concluded that the Agreement was vague and uncertain. 
It was never determined, at the time of the signing of the docu-
ment, which of the three lots owned by Respondents was to be sold 
to Appellant. The Agreement itself specified only that the lot 
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was located at the "coiner of Hillview and Ninth East." The 
evidence conclusively demonstrated that Respondents never did, at 
any time, own a lot so situated. The conclusion that the contract 
was too indefinite to be capable of specific performance was 
further supported by the fact that the terms of financing were 
"to be arranged," indicating that negotiations had not taken 
place but were yet future. Appellant's own testimony indicates 
that it had not been decided, at the signing of the Agreement, 
whether payment would be in a lump sum, or by installment pay-
ments [R. 57]. There was no definite understanding that the 
balance of the purchase price would be paid at the closing of the 
title to the property. 
Appellant is not in a position to pray for specific perfor-
mance. He has not done equity himself by tendering the purchase 
price to Respondents. Nor has he demonstrated that at any time 
he had obtained financing necessary to consummate the purchase of 
the property. 
Respondents respectfully assert that the judgment of the 
lower court was proper and pray that it be affirmed. 
Dated this 25th day of June, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER 
By Is! 
Harbld A. Hintze 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Respondents were served upon Appellant by mailing the copies 
thereof to his attorneys, John Parsons and Thomas N. Crowther, 
455 South 300 East, Suite 201, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 
~71'<- day of June, 1979. 
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